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Abstract 
Using a unique methodology for identifying undocumented workers across counties in the state of 
Georgia in the United States, we find a negative relationship between the share of unauthorized 
workers and the share of votes going to the Democrats in elections. Furthermore, we show that this 
effect is more pronounced for the presence of unauthorized immigrants than Hispanics; is stronger in 
counties with higher median household income; and is substantively larger in U.S. Congressional 
elections than Gubernatorial or Senatorial elections. We discuss which political economy theories are 
most consistent with this set of findings. 
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Unauthorized Immigration and Electoral Outcomes   
 
1 Introduction  
 For many developed countries, immigration is a “hot button” election issue. In February 
2014, for example, Switzerland held a national referendum “Against mass immigration.” The aim of 
the referendum was to limit immigration by implementing new quotas for foreign workers. This anti-
immigrant referendum received more than 50 percent of the popular vote. Similarly, the European 
Parliamentary election in 2014 demonstrated electoral support for immigration restriction across a 
number of countries in Europe. Far right parties from France, Greece, Holland, and Denmark gained 
large increases in representation in the EU legislature, much of which resulted from these parties’ 
tough campaigns against immigration in their home countries. In Germany, where taking a stance 
against foreigners is politically sensitive, new anti-immigration political parties emerged with some 
parties putting up banners and handing out fliers against immigrants that were explicitly anti-
foreigner.  
 Unauthorized immigration has also become a divisive and controversial issue in U.S. 
elections. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that roughly over 11.7 million unauthorized 
immigrants live in the United States illegally and comprise approximately 4 percent of the total 
population (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013). Even though the unauthorized are without 
the right to vote, the presence of unauthorized immigrants poses significant economic, demographic, 
and welfare spending related challenges to the native, voting population and these challenges may 
translate into changes in election outcomes. Some politicians, for example, argue that an increase in 
populations of unauthorized immigrants can lead to an increase in Republican support, especially 
among native-born, white voters, who, because of their fears, will align themselves with the party 
that is strict on immigration policies. Beyond the political rhetoric, however, there is little empirical 
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evidence connecting the presence of unauthorized immigrants to electoral outcomes. To our 
knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical investigation of the relationship between flows of 
unauthorized immigrants and electoral outcomes in the U.S. over time.  
 When it comes to immigration policy in the U.S., the Republican and Democratic parties 
align themselves on opposite sides of the political spectrum, at least when we examine their official 
platforms. The 2012 Republican Platform argues that, "Illegal immigration undermines [economic] 
benefits and affects U.S. workers," and, "States efforts to reduce illegal immigration must be 
encouraged, not attacked" (www.gop.com). The Democratic Platform, meanwhile, calls for, 
"comprehensive immigration reform that supports our economic goals and reflects our values as both 
a nation of laws and a nation of immigrants" (www.democrats.org). Most acknowledge that 
"comprehensive" means a plan that includes amnesty for unauthorized immigrants who are currently 
residing in the U.S. The Republicans, however, have no such plan and some, like Georgia 
Republican Representative Paul Broun, worry about a Democratic shift due to changing 
demographics in Southern states (Perez, 2014). Broadly speaking, the Republicans support stricter 
immigration policies, such as border controls and deportation, whereas Democrats support more 
liberal, inclusive, immigration policies. 
 Because of their proximity to the Mexican border, unauthorized immigration is a particularly 
salient electoral issue in Southern U.S. states. Inflows from Mexico alone make up more than half of 
all unauthorized immigrations to the U.S. (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013). Although 
immigration is a federal level issue, starting as early as 2005, states (especially Southern states -- see 
Ozden, Neagu, and Mattoo, 2008) began passing their own immigration laws (NCSL, 2005). State 
level policies that target unlawful immigrants include requiring employers to use e-verify, an 
electronic program that checks the immigration status of new workers; legislation restricting drivers 
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license; and enacting higher barriers for public benefits including housing, retirement benefits, and 
school registration. The policy domains targeted by the state are not a random sample; instead they 
imply that threats to jobs, demographics, and welfare spending concerns are at the forefront of the 
immigration debate within Southern states and at the fore in voters’ minds when choosing 
representatives -- in a survey of Georgia residents taken in 2006, both 3 months and 1 month before 
the November 2006 general election, immigration was the second most important issue to voters, 
outranked only by the Iraq war (CCES 2006, Authors’ calculations).  
In order to help explain the impact of unauthorized immigration on election outcomes, we 
draw upon three different political economy explanations to derive a set of theoretical expectations 
with competing predictions. The first theory comes from models of international trade and concerns 
the pre-tax distributive effects of immigration that may be particularly threatening to low-skilled 
native workers; the second theory considers voters’ feelings of race and ethic threat effects; the third 
theory considers post-tax redistributive concerns that link voters to unauthorized immigrants as 
potential or perceived “welfare magnets,” or populations that use government provided services 
intensively and without making appropriate contributions to the public coffers. We then test a set of 
predictions stemming from each of these three theories using a new data set in three different 
electoral races: gubernatorial, senate, and U.S. congressional elections.  
 Using a unique employee-employer matched data set that identifies the number of 
undocumented workers by county in the state of Georgia between 1990 and 2011, we examine 
whether the share of the work force that is undocumented helps to explain changes in the Democratic 
vote share. In order to make sure that we are identifying the correct causal mechanism, we offer 
additional in- and out-migration analysis that captures demographic changes to counties and 
ecological inference analysis that estimates voter transition probabilities, between elections, at the 
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county level. Our supplemental analysis suggests that changes in voting behavior best explains the 
effect of unauthorized immigration on elections rather than alternative explanations such as in- and 
out-migration and that vote switching is the primary mechanism underlying the aggregate analysis.  
 As a preview to the results, we find that a greater presence of unauthorized immigrants 
reduces support for Democrats. This is consistent with theories of economic, racial, and ethnic threat, 
and theories based on concerns over welfare spending. We also find, however, that threat effects 
from the unauthorized are stronger than threat effects from the Hispanic populations. This suggests 
that demographic changes alone are not the main cause of electoral support for the Republicans and 
that interestingly, status matters.1 Furthermore, we also find that richer rather than poorer counties 
are more likely to turn to the Republicans even when we control for county level income, race, and 
previous election results. This helps to distinguish between theories based on pre-tax threats and 
theories based on post-tax redistributive concerns. Our findings provide the most consistent support 
for a welfare spending threat effect. The Republicans receive the most electoral support when the 
population of unauthorized immigrants is high and simultaneously, the county is relatively wealthy.  
2 Theoretical Foundation and Previous Findings  
 There are several theories that link the presence of a new, large, minority population with 
changes in natives’ voting behavior in elections. Each theory is outlined here as they specifically 
relate to the presence of unauthorized immigrants and elections. Table 1 shows how the different 
theories described below lead to different predicted relationships between unauthorized immigrants 
and election outcomes.  
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                
1 Status here refers to the appropriate employment documentation as opposed to other kinds of status such as class status 
or social standing. 
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  2.1  Pre-tax Labor Market Competition  
 An influx of people, like other international factor flows, can lead to distributional changes in 
factor-returns among the native-born, with some winning more from immigration than others. Factor 
models that depict the effects of immigration on returns to factors of production expect that an 
increase in undocumented workers will increase the returns to owners of capital and highly-skilled 
workers and threaten jobs of competing low-skilled workers (see, for example, Scheve and Slaughter, 
2001 and Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter 2007). The casual mechanism here is that firms can hire the 
unauthorized for lower relative wages than they can the same worker with documentation (see 
Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli 2013). As a result, firms tend to hire more of these people and less 
documented low-skilled workers. The greater the flow of undocumented workers, the greater the 
expected wage changes for the displaced population. Because voters think that wage changes and 
higher risks of unemployment result from higher numbers of unauthorized workers, this motivates 
voters to prevent the influx of these people, seeking to secure their wages and jobs through 
protectionist policies. Because the Republican Party is more protectionist than the Democrats, it 
follows that that economic explanations predict that higher levels of undocumented workers (who are 
generally unskilled) will translate into greater support for protectionism, especially amongst lower-
skilled workers, and more votes for the Republicans. It’s important to understand that it does not 
matter whether the presence of unauthorized workers actually lowers wages or employment 
opportunities of authorized workers in order for voting behavior to change, just that workers/voters 
think that it does.2  
 If, however, job competition actually reduces voters' incomes, they may become more likely 
to align themselves with the Democratic ideals. Furthermore, changes in undocumented workers can 
                                                
2 In fact, recent evidence suggests that any wage impact of the presence of undocumented workers is, at worst, negligible 
(see Hotchkiss, Quispe-Agnoli, and Rios-Avila, forthcoming). 
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also change voter turnout, especially among the unemployed. Recent evidence by Burden and 
Wichowsky (2012) show that an increase in unemployment leads to higher levels of participation by 
unemployed workers at the polls. Empirically, if labor market competition is the reason for an 
increase in votes, and an increase in Republican votes in particular, then we expect to see this effect 
most strongly in poorer counties, as it is low-skilled voters that are most likely to feel economically 
threatened by the unauthorized.  
Empirical support for this claim is mixed, however. Some authors find that the poor are no 
more likely to have anti-immigrant opinions (Citrin, Reingold, and Green, 1990; Espenshade and 
Calhoun, 1993). Alternatively, other authors find that vulnerable labor market conditions increase 
anti-immigration support (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1992; Muller and Espenshade, 1985). 
Ramakrishnan (2005) finds that Republican areas are twice as likely to propose restrictive legislation 
than areas controlled by Democrats, especially for those voters in majority white areas. Examining 
anti-immigrant sentiments across-countries, Mayda (2006) finds that on average, higher skilled 
workers are more likely to be pro-immigration. In the U.S., Facchini and Mayda (2009) find that 
higher levels of high-skilled workers are positively associated with more openness to immigration. 
Moving away from observational studies, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) provide an experiment that 
directly tests the relationship between skill-level and attitudes on immigration. They find that both 
low-skilled and high-skilled workers prefer high-skilled immigrants to low-skilled immigrants. Even 
more recently, Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo (2013) find persuasive evidence that job competition 
amongst hi-tech workers make natives much more likely to support restrictive immigration policy, 
again lending support to the idea that labor market competition matters.  
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 2.2 Racial and Ethnic Threats 
 As suggested above, where you live and whom you live around matters for how you vote 
(Schelling 1969). In addition to how much income you and your neighbors make, the race and 
ethnicity of the newcomers may also play a role in shaping electoral outcomes. Power theories and 
theories of group threat argue that in the face of incoming minority groups, lower income groups, 
especially dominant racial majority groups, are more likely to defect from the Democrats and switch 
their votes towards to the Republicans. Furthermore, white voters in the South seem particularly 
electorally sensitive to demographic changes (see for example Giles and Buckner 1994; Giles and 
Hertz, 1994). Consequently, these theories suggest that an increase in unauthorized immigrants will 
pose a racial and ethnic threat and shift elections toward Republicans. In addition, we might expect 
to find a similar, or stronger, reaction to Mexican immigrants, generally. This is because more than 
half of all unauthorized immigrants to the U.S. are from Mexico (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-
Barrera, 2013). If less educated people, "are on average more nativist and culturally intolerant of 
foreigners" (Malhotra et al. 2013, p. 3), then we might also expect to see a more intense reaction to 
racial and ethnic threats in poorer and whiter counties. 
Early research by Matthews and Prothro (1963) find that an increase in the number of blacks 
causes an increase in white voter registration in the South. Similarly, an increase in the number of 
blacks also affects white partisanship. Research by Giles and Hertz (1994) find that, in Louisiana 
between 1975 and 1990, an increase in the number of blacks is positively associated with the number 
of whites voting Republican (also see Giles and Buckner 1993). More recent research by Enos (2013) 
shows that racial enclaves and electoral effects persist in the face of inflowing minorities. He finds 
that not only the number of blacks but also the concentration of ethnic minorities predicts the 2008 
presidential elections. In addition, making use of experimental data, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) 
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find that non-economic reasons, such as xenophobia better predicts the publics’ immigration 
preferences than arguments based on economic considerations, such as pre-tax labor market 
concerns. 
 2.3  Post-Tax Redistributive Threats 
 Finally, the expense of social service provision (whether actual expense or perceived 
expense) is often raised as a reason why unauthorized immigration is problematic (for example, see 
Scheve and Slaughter 2007; Becerra et al. 2012). Indeed, Tolbert and Hero (1996) find evidence that 
restricting access to social services is popular in those counties with either a mix of ethnic groups, 
counties with above average Hispanic population, or counties with a dominant white majority. If 
concern about the added burden that unauthorized immigrants place on the social safety net is 
important to voters, we expect that a higher level of unauthorized immigrants resulting in stronger 
support for Republicans. Furthermore, this effect should also be larger for the presence of the 
unauthorized, as opposed to immigrants, or Hispanics, in general. This is because voters may 
perceive that the unauthorized are likely to make even greater demands on the system than 
immigrants with proper documentation and may also perceive that the unauthorized are less likely to 
contribute to public funds.3 
  Milner and Tingley (2013) find that support for immigration policies depends on fiscal 
redistribution, where richer people are more likely to support immigration when welfare spending is 
low and less likely to support immigration when welfare spending is high. We would, therefore, 
expect to see a stronger reaction to the presence of unauthorized immigrants in richer counties, where 
taxpayers face a larger burden supporting the social safety net (in the presence of a progressive tax 
                                                
3 For example, the unauthorized rarely have health insurance and, therefore, make use of emergency rooms and public 
hospitals for the treatment of nonemergency health-related problems (Goldman et al. 2005, and Passel 2005). In addition, 
children of unauthorized immigrants often need additional resources in school to overcome their lack of English fluency 
(CBO 2007). 
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system). To the extent that social services are supported by tax payments at the local level (e.g., 
police, hospitals, schools, welfare programs etc.), we also expect to see a stronger effect the more 
local the elections. In fact the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2007) document that most of the 
fiscal burden of unauthorized immigrants falls on local, rather than Federal, coffers.  
3 Data and Analysis 
 This paper estimates the effect of unauthorized immigrants on the share of the Democratic 
vote at the county level in Gubernatorial, U.S. Senatorial, and U.S. Congressional elections in the 
state of Georgia between 1990 and 2011. Undocumented workers are used as a proxy for 
unauthorized immigration. Undocumented workers are likely to best capture the economic threat 
(through the labor force) of a larger unauthorized presence.  
 3.1  Undocumented Workers in Georgia  
 Georgia is an excellent place to test the relationship between electoral outcomes and 
unauthorized immigrants. Firstly, unauthorized immigration is a prominent and state wide political 
issue. In Georgia, Republican legislators have initiated several laws designed to combat the growing 
number of unauthorized immigrants in the state of Georgia. Secondly, there is an estimated 425,000 
unauthorized immigrants living in Georgia, ranking Georgia as the 7th largest host-state of 
unauthorized immigrants (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013). The large numbers of the 
unauthorized and their growth in recent years makes Georgia a state where immigration policy is 
salient in Georgia elections. For example, consider HB87, or the "Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Enforcement Act of 2011." This legislation reforms investigation, verification, enforcement and 
penalties related to immigrants in the state of Georgia. Further, Senate Bill 160 signed by Georgia's 
Governor in April 2013, blocks undocumented workers from state driver's licenses, grants, public 
housing and retirement benefits. Finally, Georgia is a relatively poor state, ranking 33 in median 
10 
household income (www.census.gov/acs), making voters particularly sensitive to changes in income 
(Gelman et al., 2007) and perhaps less tolerant of foreigners (Malhotra et al. 2013).   
 3.2  Dependent Variable  
 A decrease of support for Democrats within a county can occur for a number of reasons: (1) 
Voters can leave the Democrats to vote for either a Republican candidate or a candidate in another 
party, (2) Democrats can become less likely to vote, (3) Republicans can become more likely to vote, 
and (4) Democrats can move out or Republicans can move into the county. The first three sources of 
declining support for Democrats results from changes in voting -- either voting differently or voting 
more or voting less. The fourth potential source does not result from changing voter behavior and can 
confound our interpretation. We specifically address the possibility of this confounding effect.  
 The dependent variable, election outcome, measures the total share of Democratic votes cast 
relative to the total number of votes cast for either the Democrats or the Republicans. The election 
data are obtained from the Georgia Secretary of State website (www.sos.ga.gov/elections). The 
analysis in this paper considers Gubernatorial, U.S. Senatorial, and U.S. Congressional elections by 
county in the state of Georgia.  
 3.3  Independent Variable of Primary Interest  
 As a measure of the impact of unauthorized immigrants, we use the share of workers in a 
county that is undocumented. One of our key contributions is that we use a unique method to 
measure the county level share of undocumented workers. The primary data used to construct the 
independent variable used in this paper are the Employer File and the Individual Wage File, 
compiled by the Georgia Department of Labor for the purposes of administering the state's 
Unemployment Insurance program. These data are highly confidential and strictly limited in their 
distribution. The Employer File provides an almost complete census of firms in Georgia, covering 
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approximately 99.7 percent of all wage and salary workers (Committee on Ways and Means, 2004). 
The firm-level information includes the number of employees, and the worker file includes the 
worker's Social Security Number (SSN) from which we determine whether the worker is authorized 
to legally work or not. It is our view that this new measure of undocumented workers makes an 
important empirical contribution to the literature because our measure is derived from actual 
employment records. It is therefore most appropriate in linking the threat effects from globalization, 
in this case flows of undocumented workers that are actually employed in the U.S. economy, with 
natives’ voting behavior.  
 Details of how the SSN is used to identify undocumented workers are contained in a 
supplemental appendix, available online. The abbreviated version is that there are some easily 
identifiable ways in which a SSN is determined to be invalid. We conclude that some of those 
reasons are either errors or the result of incomplete record keeping by the firm. We restrict our 
identification of undocumented workers to invalid SSNs that are more likely to have been generated 
by the worker—numbers that look valid, but are not. Workers with invalid SSNs for any other reason 
are not included in our count of undocumented workers; this will clearly undercount the actual 
number of undocumented workers. However, several robustness checks makes us confident that our 
sample of undocumented workers is a valid representation of the magnitude of the presence of 
unauthorized immigrants in a county. 
 In some specifications, the share of undocumented workers is replaced by the percent of the 
population that is Hispanic. These data are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau Population 
Estimates (http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html). 
12 
 3.4  Additional Control Variables  
 In addition to the total number of undocumented workers, we also want to account for the fact 
that some counties are wealthier than others. In order to do this, we include data for average county 
median household income. These data are gathered from the U.S. Census, Small Area Income and 
Poverty Estimates. We match median household income in a given county for an election year. Each 
variable contains one observation for each Georgia County for each year between 1989 and 2011, 
with the exception of the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, and 1996.  
 For observations for each of these five missing years for each county, we impute the missing 
data and recover estimates of median household income (details available from the authors). We also 
control for the racial composition of counties using data from the U.S. Census Bureau Population 
Estimates (http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html). In addition, county and election 
fixed effects are included. 
 3.5  Methodological Details 
 Figure 1 shows the Democratic vote share for Gubernatorial, Senatorial, and U.S. 
Congressional elections in the state of Georgia between 1990 and 2011. While the decline in 
Democratic vote share in Georgia over time is slight, it is observable. Figure 2 shows the dramatic 
growth in the share of undocumented workers in Georgia during this time period. The question is 
whether there is a systematic relationship between these two variables that will hold up across 
counties while controlling for other characteristics of the counties at the same time.  
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 In addition, Figure 3 illustrates that undocumented workers are not all concentrated in 
counties that are primarily Democrat or Republican. This suggests that there is some opportunity for 
electoral shifting across the whole state. 
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[Figure 3 about here] 
 The statistical analysis involves estimating the following linear relationship via Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS):  
𝑙𝑛 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!,!,!1− 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!,!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑐!,!!! + 𝛽!′𝑋!,! + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!,!!!+𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏!,! + 𝜀!,!,! , (1) 
where 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!,!,! , as described above, is the share of the vote in county i in election j in year t 
that accrues to the Democrats. We perform a logistic transformation on the dependent variable so that 
it is no longer bound by zero and one; OLS estimation of the relationship is valid and we can recover 
predicted values that do not fall outside of the zero/one range (see Baum 2008, Madalla 1983, p. 30). 
The coefficients from this estimation are interpreted as the marginal effect of the regressor on the 
log-odds ratio of DemShare. However, since our interest is not on the odds of the Democrats 
receiving one hundred percent of the vote, which is what the log-odds tells us, we report the marginal 
effect of the regressors of interest on a percentage point change in DemShare (see notes to Table 2). 
 The regressor of interest, percent of undocumented workers in a particular county, has the 
potential of being endogenous to the democratic share of the vote in that county. While the potential 
for voting behavior of the population group of interest (unauthorized immigrants) affecting the 
outcome is not a concern here, as unauthorized immigrants do not vote, the data are not a panel of 
individual voting behavior. Consequently, we only know the share of votes going to Democrats at 
each election conditional on the composition of voters in the county during that election. In addition, 
out-migration of voters may occur as the result of the presence of undocumented workers, so that the 
results reflect changes in composition of voters within the county, rather than a change in voting 
behavior within a county. Analysis on in- and out-migration described below addresses this specific 
concern, but additionally, we lag the regressor of interest, PerUndoc, to help avoid the possibility of 
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reverse causality. We use a two-year lag in order to make the potential nearness of impact consistent 
across different types of elections that are held at different intervals.  
 Other regressors, measured in the same year as the election, 𝑋!,!, include real median 
household income in the county in the election year and the share of the population that is black. 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏!,! is a dummy variable indicating whether the incumbent for election j is a Democrat. 
In addition, both election and county fixed effects are included to control for election specific 
(county invariant) and county specific (time invariant) determinants of the Democratic share of the 
vote. We also include an election-lagged value of the dependent variable to account for serial 
correlation between election outcomes; this would also capture the average partisanship of the 
electorate.4   
 Relating this empirical model to the theories detailed earlier, all three theories would predict a 
negative estimate of 𝛽!, unless job competition reduced voters' incomes making them more likely to 
align with Democratic. We will estimate equation (1) replacing 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑐 with PerHispanic 
(percent Hispanic population in the county) in order to test predictions of the racial and ethnic and 
welfare and spending threat theories. Differential effects across median county incomes and types of 
election will also help us distinguish between these two theories, which predict differential intensities 
of the threat based on income and election level.  
4 Results  
 Table 2 contains the main results of the paper. Equation (1) is estimated for Gubernatorial, 
Senatorial, and U.S. Congressional elections. The results in columns 1-3 suggest that there is a threat 
effect from the presence of undocumented workers: as the share of undocumented workers grows in 
                                                
4 Since it is well known that inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in a fixed-effect model may introduce estimation 
bias when the number of time periods is "small" (see Judson and Owen 1999 and Kiviet 1995), we re-estimate the model 
excluding the lagged dependent variable and obtain essentially the same results, suggesting the any bias in our case is 
quite limited. 
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a county, support for the Democrats decreases. On average, a one-percentage point increase in the 
share of undocumented workers in a county results in a 1.04 percentage point decline in Democrat 
share of the vote in the next U.S. Congressional election. The average share of the Democrat vote in 
Congressional elections varies from over 50 percent through the mid-1990s to roughly 41 percent in 
the 2000s. In addition, while the relationship between the percent undocumented and the Democrat 
share of the vote is not statistically significant in the Gubernatorial and Senatorial elections, the point 
estimates suggest that the threat effect is stronger as it relates to Congressional candidates. This 
suggests that the presence of undocumented workers is more salient in Congressional elections.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 We also see in Table 2 that the Democratic share of the vote is higher in counties with a 
greater share of black voters and with lower median household income, which is consistent with 
findings in Gelman et al. (2007) and elsewhere in the literature. As might also be expected, there is 
inter-temporal dependence in Democratic vote share, evidenced by the positive and significant 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable suggesting that, unsurprisingly, party ID is important. 
The exception is in Congressional elections, where Democratic share in the previous elections 
appears to be negatively related to the Democratic share in the current election. However, 
Democratic incumbency is highly positively significant in all elections for determining share of 
Democratic votes. 
 Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera (2013) estimate that the unauthorized population in 
Georgia increased from 3.1 percent in 2000 to 4.4 percent in 2010 (a 1.3 percentage point increase). 
Based on the estimates in Table 2, the influx of unauthorized might account for a loss of 1.35 percent 
of the votes going to the Democratic for the U.S. Congressional candidate over this time period (1.3 
times 1.038), which is substantially significant.  
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 We also estimate a number of variations on the model specification in equation (1) and obtain 
essentially the same results. Rather than use Democratic share of the (majority party) votes, we also 
constructed a supplemental liberal vote share measure, combining the Green party votes with the 
Democratic votes and the Libertarian votes with the Republican votes.5 We then run this “liberal” 
versus “conservative” measure and find no appreciable differences in the results. We also explore a 
model that includes both the current and lagged values of the undocumented worker share 
(essentially resulting in a growth analysis). Only the lagged value is statistically significant in this 
specification, suggesting that the level of undocumented workers, rather than the growth in 
undocumented workers, is important to voters. In other words, it is the stock of undocumented 
workers that matters to voters, rather than the flow. Also, in addition to including a lagged value of 
the dependent variable, we estimate the model allowing the error tern to follow an AR(1) process. 
Again, the results are robust and are essentially the same. In addition, we also include a measure of 
county population, however, the coefficient is neither substantively or statistically significant in any 
model specification, suggesting that the county fixed effect is picking up this and other 
characteristics of the county that change little over time. 
 The results in Table 2 indicate a decline in support for Democrats with a greater presence of 
unauthorized immigrants. The next sections detail the estimations designed to disentangle which of 
the three theories is most supported. 
 4.1  Unauthorized versus Hispanic  
 The economic threat and racial and ethnic threat theories suggest that we should see as much 
of a decline in support for the Democrats when we estimate equation (1) with percent Hispanic in 
                                                
5 The Green party platform is even more extreme than Democrats in their support for unauthorized immigrants 
(http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Green_Party_Immigration.htm). The Libertarian position is more nuanced 
(http://www.lp.org/issues/immigration), but we code Libertarians right of center. In addition to getting similar results, the 
number of votes going to either of these parties in any election in Georgia is small. 
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place of percent undocumented. A greater presence of any immigrants is theorized to threaten jobs of 
natives, and, as mentioned earlier, the majority of unauthorized immigrants are Hispanic; many 
natives, it could be argued, may not distinguish between Hispanics and the unauthorized. The welfare 
and spending theory, however, suggests that we should see a larger reaction by voters to percent 
undocumented than to percent Hispanic in the county, since the unauthorized are perceived (rightly 
or wrongly) to be more of a local fiscal burden.6 The coefficients on percent Hispanic are negative, 
as well, but significantly smaller than the impact estimated from percent undocumented, and only 
marginally significantly different from zero in the U.S. Congressional regression, lending support for 
the welfare and spending threat prediction as opposed to theories of job or racial and ethnic threats. 
 As another robustness check, we included both PercentUndoc and PercentHisp at the same 
time in a single regression.  In these results, PercentHisp is never statistically significant and 
PercentUndoc is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level, with a marginal effect 
of -0.77, in the Congressional regression.  Since PercentHisp and PercentUndoc are correlated with 
one another, it's not surprising that the inclusion of PercentHisp reduces the power of PercentUndoc, 
although the effect is larger and its impact significant.  This offers additional evidence that 
PercentUndoc is measuring something in addition to the presence of a larger Hispanic population. 
 Is it reasonable to expect that the average voter can distinguish well enough between the 
authorized or unauthorized status of Latinos to react differently at the polls to their presence? There 
is evidence that individuals at least have some confidence that they can distinguish between the 
unauthorized and unauthorized. In a study by Murray and Marx (2013) respondents to a survey 
clearly differentiate between potential threats (both economic and cultural) felt by unauthorized and 
authorized immigrants. Greater threats were perceived from unauthorized immigrants than from 
                                                
6 While the evidence of actual added burden of unauthorized immigrants on social safety nets is mixed (see Becerra et al. 
2012 and CBO 2007), there is significant evidence that the media plays a powerful role in shaping perceptions about that 
burden (for example, see Facchini et al. 2010). 
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authorized immigrants, and the perceptions of threat increased according to the age of the survey 
respondent. 
 4.2  Geography of Constituents Matters  
 Native-born voters concerned about perceived burdens on social services (and their tax 
dollars) at the local level should produce a stronger effect in elections where they feel they have the 
greatest influence, or in elections where the victor has more local concerns and a more local 
presence. All else equal, since U.S. Congressional representatives represent a much smaller 
geographic area than U.S. Senators or Governors, voters are more likely to personally know a 
Congressional candidate and a Congress person will be more responsive to local perceptions (see 
Fennon, 1979 and Arnold, 1990). While the lack of significance of the coefficient on PerUndoc in 
the Senatorial and Gubernatorial elections could simply be the result of lack of statistical power, we 
note the significance of other estimated regressors. Even if the estimates on PerUndoc were 
statistically significant, we also note that the point estimates increase substantially as the election 
moves from U.S. Senatorial to Gubernatorial to U.S. Congressional. 
 4.3  Rich versus Poor Counties  
 We also check whether or not our results are driven by differences across poor, middle, and 
rich counties by looking at income by terciles adjusted for inflation. The results in Table 3 indicate 
that reduced support for Democrats is more pronounced the wealthier a county. We argued earlier 
that this result would support the post-tax welfare and spending threat theory, as more wealthy 
voters, who are in a higher tax bracket, will object more strongly to the perception that unauthorized 
immigrants are straining social safety nets. It's important to note that this result does not depend on 
whether unauthorized immigrants are actually placing a heavy burden on social services, just that 
they are perceived to be doing so (see Rothschild et al. 2013).  
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[Table 3 about here]  
 We also see in Table 3 that the stronger impact of the undocumented versus Hispanics, in 
general, holds across county median income levels. Also note that in Georgia median household 
income and the percent of the population that is Black are highly negatively correlated. We control 
for the population racial mix in the county in the results found in Table 3, allowing us to the abstract 
from the racial mix of the population and focus on the effect across income (holding race constant). 
 4.4  Robustness Exercises 
 4.4.1 In- and Out-Migration. We find that as the share of undocumented workers in a county 
increases, the share of the vote going to the Democratic candidate in an election decreases. An 
alternative explanation to changing voter behavior is that, faced with an increase in the number of 
unauthorized immigrants, Democrats move out of the county. If Democratic voters experience 
greater economic threats than Republican voters (through job threat), then Democrats might flee 
areas with growing numbers of undocumented workers and that is why we see lower support in 
counties with higher shares of undocumented workers.  
 Since we do not have individual voting data, the best we can do to distinguish between 
possible alternative explanations is to investigate migration patterns. In order to do so, we make use 
of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) county-to-county Migration Data. These data contain 
residential location information for 95 to 98 percent of the individual income tax filing population. 
For each county in Georgia, for each year, we know the number of people who moved into the 
county (inflow), the number of people who moved out of the county (outflow), and the number of 
people who remained in the county (non-movers). Data are available from 2005 through to 2010.  
 We are interested in whether the outflow in one year is significantly related to the share of 
undocumented workers in the previous year. It is also feasible that owners of capital (likely to be 
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Republicans) move to counties with higher numbers of undocumented workers as they offer a new 
source of inexpensive labor. Because of this, we also consider inflow migration.  
 If migration patterns are the mechanism at work behind the parameter estimates in Table 2, 
then we should observe a positive correlation between the share of undocumented workers in the 
previous year and the county's outflow percentage. Of course, we do not know whether those moving 
out of the county are more likely to vote Democratic or Republican, therefore a positive correlation is 
only a necessary condition. Additionally, if owners of capital (Republicans) are moving into counties 
with higher shares of undocumented workers to take advantage of economic opportunities, then we 
should observe a positive correlation between the share of undocumented workers and the inflow 
percentage. Again, a positive correlation is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition.  
 Table 4 presents results from a logistic regression which allows us to control for other county 
characteristics and county and year fixed effects, in addition to the previous year's percent of 
unauthorized immigrants. The coefficient on lagged undocumented workers is positive in the outflow 
equation and negative in the inflow equation, but neither is statistically significantly different from 
zero. These results suggest that as the share of undocumented workers increases, Democratic 
defection is not, at least primarily, being driven by migration patterns. We do note however, that 
there are other statistically significant relationships that appear in this estimation exercise; in-
migration is lower to counties with a high share of Blacks and higher in counties with a higher share 
of the vote going to Democrats in the previous election. This second results may be picking up 
growth in urban counties, which are more likely to vote Democratic. 
[Table 4 about here] 
4.4.2 Ecological Inference and the Georgia 2004 and 2006 Elections. One potential problem 
with making inferences about changing voter behavior from the results reported here is that the 
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analysis relies on aggregate data and therefore cannot tell us about actual voter behavior (King, 
1997). One strategy to overcome this shortcoming is to compute the voter transition probabilities—or 
the transitions in party preference of voters between elections at the county level— using ecological 
inference. In order to do this, we examine voter transition probabilities in Georgia U.S. 
Congressional elections between the 2004 and 2006 elections. We choose to examine the 2004 to 
2006 elections for two reasons. First, as we discussed, immigration is a salient topic in Georgia and 
especially in the 2006 election; therefore we suspect that the native voting population was more 
likely to have information, worries, and concerns about illegal immigration and the potential 
(perceived or actual) threat effects of undocumented workers on the native born voting population 
between these elections. Second, because of redistricting, elections before, as well as elections after 
2006, do not always have the same electoral boundaries and therefore do not have stable voting 
populations. By examining voter transitions between elections where the district lines are the same, 
we can be more confident the voting population is stable between elections than if we use elections 
between periods where there is redistricting (of course voters that move between elections are not 
accounted for, however, we have accounted for them in the in- and out-migration analysis discussed 
above). One significant problem with using the 2004 election, however, is that there are several 
uncontested elections: 6 out of 13 districts are uncontested. This makes the uncertainty in our 
inferences on the estimated transition probabilities for districts without a challenger either extremely 
large or alternatively, extremely small if the same party stays in power across elections.  
In order to calculate the aggregate voter transitional probabilities from 2004 to 2006, we use 
Bayesian Multinomial Dirichlet estimation for ecological inference (Lau, Moore and Kellerman, 
2007; Moore, 2007). The parameter estimates that we are interested in, are  𝛽!!and  𝛽!", or the 
proportion of Democrats in 2004 that voted for the Republicans in 2006 and the proportion of 
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Republicans that voted Republican in 2006. Table 5 shows the data setup, where the cells are 
unobserved and are the estimates of interest.  
[Table 5 about here] 
We run the ecological inference model which estimates the proportion of voter switching (or 
staying) within counties. After tuning and burning in the Markov chain, we take 100,000 draws from 
the posterior, saving every 10th draw. Figure 4 shows the estimated density of the voter transition 
probabilities from voting Democrats in 2004 to voting Republican in 2006, with the mean estimate 
indicated on the chart. Here we see that the average probability of switching from Democrat in the 
2004 election to Republican in the 2006 election is large. The mean estimated proportion of the 
population that voted Democrat in 2004 and switched their votes to Republican in 2006 is 
approximately 60. This is not to say that an additional 60 percent of the Democrats voted for the 
Republicans in all elections. It is to say, however, that at the margin, of those that voted Democrat in 
the 2004 elections, the estimated marginal proportion of them that voted for the Republicans in the 
2006 election is estimated at 60 whereas the estimated proportion that stuck with the Democrats in 
the 2006 election is 40. In addition, the estimated proportion of people that voted Republican in 2004 
and stuck with the Republicans 2006 is approximately 80, which means that the estimated people that 
switched to the Democrats is less than 20 (assuming only two parties ). According to the estimated 
row marginal, this implies that the Democrats saw an estimated greater loss in marginal support than 
the Republicans, on average, across the two elections. This provides further evidence that what we 
are capturing in our analysis is changes in voting behavior, on net, from the Democrats to 
Republicans, across elections.  
 [Figure 4 about here] 
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4.4.3 Certain Counties or Years Driving the Results? As a test of sensitivity to time period or 
county inclusion, we undertook a number of estimations on a sub-set of counties and years. We 
tested only the U.S. Congressional results and Table 6 contains the results from additional 
regressions. While there is some variation in precision in estimation, the negative impact of 
unauthorized immigrants on electoral support for the Democrats holds within each decade and 
among counties with larger or smaller shares of unauthorized. The lack of significance within 
counties with low levels of unauthorized may suggest that the impact on voters may only take hold 
after the share of unauthorized reaches a certain threshold. However, the marginal effect even in that 
sub-group is of similar magnitude to the others.  
[Table 6 about here] 
5 Conclusion  
 Because of a lack of data, no empirical study has been able to examine the influence of 
unauthorized immigration on electoral outcomes in the United States over time. By using estimates 
of the number of undocumented workers in counties across the state of Georgia, we find a significant 
negative relationship between larger shares of undocumented workers and support for the 
Democratic candidate. We explore several potential explanations for this relationship and find that 
concerns about the cost (or perceived costs) unauthorized immigrants are placing on the social safety 
are most likely to be driving the results. 
 We also provide evidence that the results are not being driven by composition bias of voters 
in the county, as the presence of undocumented workers is not statistically related to migration 
patterns. Finally, using ecological analysis we also show that the results are robust to considerations 
of voter transition probabilities. Richer counties instead of poorer counties are more likely to feel 
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threatened by the undocumented and more likely to switch their votes to the Republicans between 
elections.  
 Our research design has a number of important features that previous observational studies 
are unable to exploit. First, by examining county elections within a state, we are able to control for 
many of the institutional features that make cross-country or cross-state comparisons difficult. 
Second, we know from previous work that the link between individual income and voting is 
particularly strong in the South (Gelman et al., 2007) and so an analysis using Georgia data is 
particularly well suited. Third, because we are examining the effects of a non-voting population, we 
need not be concerned about problems of reverse causality. Finally, by exploiting a long time series 
instead of examining only a snapshot of the immigration sentiments of individuals in an experimental 
setting or in a one-shot opinion survey, we can make inferences about the political implications of 
immigration patterns over time.  
 Previously, the lack of reliable data measuring the change in unauthorized immigrants made 
time series analysis difficult. Using a unique dataset that identifies undocumented workers in 
counties in Georgia, we are able systematically measure the threat effects of unauthorized 
immigration over time. That being said, our empirical analysis has some important limitations. Most 
notably, since we do not have individuals’ votes, we cannot be sure that we do not know whether the 
behavior change we have identified derives from voters changing their party affiliation, or whether 
they are changing their voting intensity. However, we believe that we've empirically established a 
significant systematic relationship between changes in immigration patterns and election outcomes. 
 As far as implications of the results in this paper beyond the borders of Georgia, to the extent 
that the results are generalizable, we might expect that states with higher share of unauthorized 
immigrants and higher median household income would see greater degradation of support for 
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Democrats. Of course, unauthorized immigration is only one issue voters consider when heading to 
the polls. If other issues loom larger for voters, the impact of unauthorized immigration on electoral 
outcomes may be diluted. However, with an announcement from the U.S. Executive Branch on 
November 20, 2014, that the administration will be taking several steps to defer deportation for many 
unauthorized immigrants, the issue of unauthorized immigration is likely to remain at the forefront of 
the political debate in the U.S.  
 Furthermore, our findings suggest that there may be a growing tension in developed countries 
that have aging populations. On the one hand, countries with aging populations may need to increase 
immigration to sustain generous welfare spending such as health and retirement benefits to natives. 
On the other hand, natives, and especially wealthy voters, may react to an influx of immigrants, 
especially unauthorized immigrants, with higher appetites for protectionism. 
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Table 1. Theoretical predictions about the relationship between the presence of unauthorized 
immigrants and election outcomes. 
 
 
 
Expected Relationship 
Pre Tax 
Income 
Effects 
Racial and 
Ethnic 
Threats 
Welfare 
Spending 
Threats 
Reduced support for Democrats Maybe Yes  Yes  
 
Impact greater for presence of 
unauthorized than for Hispanic 
 
No No Yes 
Impact strongest in when constituency 
is more geographically local 
 
  Yes 
 
Impact greater in richer counties No No Yes 
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Table 2. OLS regressions by type of election; dep. var. is the logistic transformation of the share of vote going to Democrat candidate. 
 Percent Undocumented as Regressor of Interest Percent Hispanic as Regressor of Interest 
Variable Senatorial Gubernatorial Congressional Senatorial Gubernatorial Congressional 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑐!!! -1.856 
(1.380) 
[-0.414] 
-2.362 
(1.460) 
[-0.534] 
-4.646*** 
(1.757) 
[-1.038] 
-- -- -- 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝!!! -- -- -- -0.117 
(0.499) 
[-0.026] 
-0.937 
(0.659) 
[-0.211] 
-1.840* 
(0.992) 
[-0.409] 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑀𝐻𝐼! ($00000) -0.375 
(0.307) 
[-0.084] 
-1.664*** 
(0.455) 
[-0.376] 
-0.358 
(0.985) 
[-0.080] 
-0.372 
(0.314) 
[-0.083] 
-1.840*** 
(0.462) 
[-0.415] 
-0.548 
(1.010) 
[-0.122] 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘! 1.699*** 
(0.354) 
[0.379] 
2.313*** 
(0.449) 
[0.523] 
3.145*** 
(0.804) 
[0.709] 
1.698*** 
(0.353) 
[0.379] 
2.265*** 
(0.465) 
[0.517] 
3.209*** 
(0.828) 
[0.713] 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!!! 2.288*** 
(0.174) 
0.597** 
(0.242) 
-0.287*** 
(0.100¥) 
2.306*** 
(0.179) 
0.102* 
(0.055) 
-0.291*** 
(0.098) 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏!,!   = 0,1 0.354*** 
(0.025) 
0.128*** 
(0.047) 
0.412*** 
(0.038) 
0.361*** 
(0.025) 
0.127*** 
(0.046) 
0.409*** 
(0.038) 
Constant -1.875*** 
(0.179) 
-0.658** 
(0.263) 
-0.391 
(0.550) 
-1.903*** 
(0.184) 
-0.563** 
(0.263) 
29.41** 
(14.168) 
 
Observations 954 795 1440 954 795 1440 
 
Within R2  0.827 0.732 0.2618 0.826 0.745 0.262 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the share of vote in each election going to the Democratic candidate.  
Estimation also includes election and county fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, marginal effects in brackets. *** p 
<0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1. Percentage variables range between zero and one. An alternative specification excludes the lagged 
dependent variable and allows the error term to follow an AR(1) process; the results are essentially the same. Total number of unique 
counties is 159. The marginal effect for county i for a change in regressor k are calculated as follows: 
 !"#$%!!"#!!!! = −𝛽! !!(!!!)!!!!(!!!) ! , where ΒΩ! is the linear prediction for county i from the OLS estimation of the logistic 
transformation. 
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Table 3. OLS regressions; coefficients on Percent Undocumented and Percent Hispanic by county 
median household income terciles (inflation-adjusted values). 
 
Variable Low Income 
≤$37,000 
Middle Income 
>$37,000, 
≤$44,000 
High Income 
>$44,000 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑐!!! -3.658* 
(2.026) 
[-0.881] 
-6.413* 
(2.453) 
[-1.402] 
-20.729** 
(10.523) 
[-4.408] 
    𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝!!! -0.604 
(1.028) 
[-0.145] 
-2.911* 
(1.127) 
[-0.620] 
-3.918** 
(0.389) 
[-0.837] 
    
Observations 527 443 470 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the share of vote in Congressional 
elections going to the Democratic candidate. See notes to Table 2. Other regressors include median 
household income in county; percent of county population that is black; lagged dependent variable; 
an indicator for Democrat incumbent; and county and election fixed effects. 
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Table 4. OLS regressions of county outmigration and immigration, 2005-2010. 
 
Dependent Variable=  Out-migration In-migration 
(Percent Undoc.)t-1 0.6260 
(1.0091) 
[0.0408] 
-0.3372 
(1.2413) 
[-0.0246] 
   
(Real MHI)t 0.3915* 
(0.2069) 
[0.0255] 
0.3405 
(0.3261) 
[0.0248] 
   
(Percent Black)t -1.0757* 
(0.6253) 
[-0.0701] 
-2.9224*** 
(0.9524) 
[-0.2128] 
   
(Dependent Variable)t-1 -2.7607** 
(0.8702) 
[-0.1800] 
1.4470 
(0.9404) 
[0.1054] 
      
(Percent of vote going to 
Democrats in most 
recent Congressional 
election)t-1 
0.0241 
(0.0209) 
[0.0016] 
0.1493*** 
(0.0306) 
[0.0109] 
   
Constant -2.2681*** 
(0.2237) 
-1.9768*** 
(0.3370) 
   
Observations 795 795 
Within R squared 0.132 0.357 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the percent of the county's population that 
either out- or in-migrated in a given year. Estimation also includes year and county fixed effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses, marginal effects in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total 
number of unique counties is 159. Robust standard errors are estimated to correct for 
heterskedasticity. 
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Table 5: Voter Transition Probabilities for Congressional Elections 2004 to 2006 
 Republicans 2006 Democrats 2006 Totals 
Democrats 2004  𝛽!!  𝛽!" Total  
Republicans 2004 𝛽!" 𝛽!! Total  
 Total  Total  
 
 
 
Table 6. OLS regressions; coefficients on Percent Undocumented (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑐!!!) for different 
sub-groups of data, U.S. Congressional elections. 
 
 
Sub-group 
Coefficient on 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑐!!! Number of Observations 
Full Sample -4.646*** 
(1.757) 
[-1.038] 
1,440 
   
Years 1990-1998 -4.7644*** 
(1.3808) 
[-1.0400] 
590 
   
Years 2000-2010 -7.3296** 
(3.5994) 
[-1.6621] 
850 
   
Counties with less than the median percent 
undocumented (median=0.51%) 
-5.9737 
(7.9856) 
[-1.3874] 
668 
   
Counties with more than the median percent 
undocumented (median=0.51%) 
-5.7461*** 
(1.6711) 
[-1.3226] 
772 
Notes: Dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the share of vote in Congressional 
elections going to the Democratic candidate. See notes to Table 2. Other regressors include median 
household income in county; percent of county population that is black; lagged dependent variable; 
an indicator for Democrat incumbent; and county and election fixed effects. 
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Figure 1. Electoral Results by Democratic vote share and by election type 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Growth in Unauthorized Workers in Georgia (authors’ classification) 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Undocumented Workers and Vote Share Across Georgia, 2010. 
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Figure 4. Estimated Voter Transition Probabilities in Congressional Elections 2004 to 2006 
Notes: Multinomial Dirichlet estimates of Democratic Switching and Republican Staying in the 2004 
to 2006 Congressional Elections in Georgia Counties. Estimates suggest that Democrats are likely to 
switch to the Republicans in the 2006 election. Estimates using mcmc methods in the R package 
eiPack.  
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Supplemental Appendix  
for 
Unauthorized Immigration and Electoral Outcomes 
 
 
 Every quarter, employers file a report with the state Department of Labor detailing all wages 
paid to workers who are covered under the Social Security Act of 1935. Each worker on this report is 
identified by his/her social security number (SSN). There are several known characteristics of a valid 
social security number, so we check whether each number conforms to these characteristics.1 The 
first three numbers of the SSN are the Area Number. This number is assigned based on the state 
where the SSN application was made. The lowest Area Number is 001 and the highest Area Number 
ever issued, as of December 2006, is 772. Using information provided by the SSA, we can determine 
the dates at which area numbers between 691 and 772 are first assigned. Any SSN with an Area 
Number equal to 000, greater than 772, or which shows up before the officially assigned date, is 
considered invalid. The second piece of a SSN consists of the two-digit Group Number. The lowest 
group number is 01, and they are assigned in non-consecutive order. Any SSN with a Group Number 
equal to 00 or with a Group Number that appears in the data out of sequence with the Area Number 
is considered invalid. The last four digits of a SSN are referred to as the Serial Number. These are 
assigned consecutively from 0001 to 9999. Any SSN with a Serial Number equal to 0000 is invalid.  
 In 1996 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) introduced the Individual Tax Identification 
Number (ITIN) to allow individuals who had income from the U.S. to file a tax return (the first ITIN 
was issued in 1997). It is simply "tax processing number," and does not authorize an individual to 
work in the U.S. Employers are instructed by the IRS to "not accept an ITIN in place of a SSN for 
employee identification for work." An ITIN is only available to resident and nonresident aliens who 
are not eligible for U.S. employment and need identification for tax purposes. ITIN numbers have a 
                                                
1 Starting in June 2011, the Social Security Administration began constructing SSNs in a random fashion, so this 
identification of whether a SSN is valid or not is no longer possible. 
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"9" in the first digit of the Area Number and a "7" or "8" in the first digit of the Group Number. 
Anyone with this numbering scheme we identify as having an invalid Area Number. Interestingly, 
the percent of SSNs with high area numbers that also match the ITIN numbering scheme has risen 
from about one percent in 1997 to over 60 percent by the end of 2006.  
 A series of SSNs were de-commissioned by the Social Security Administration because they 
had been put on fake Social Security Cards used as props to sell wallets. Apparently, some people 
who purchased the wallets thought the fake Social Security Cards were real and started using them as 
their own. If any of these 21 "pocketbook" SSNs appear in the data, they are considered invalid, 
although their frequency is so low as to be inconsequential. In addition, a number of SSNs are 
exactly equal to the employer identification number. These are invalid, primarily because they have 
too few digits. In any instance where a SSN is used for more than one person on a firm's UI wage 
report or does not have the required number of digits (including zeros), the SSN is marked invalid.  
 The possibility that someone fraudulently uses a valid SSN assigned to someone else poses a 
special problem. First of all, the SSN will show up multiple times across firms in one quarter for 
workers with different surnames (the wage report includes the first three characters of the workers' 
surnames). With this information alone, it is not possible to know which worker is using the SSN 
fraudulently and who the valid owner of the number is. If one of the SSN/surname pairs shows up in 
the data initially in a quarter by itself, this is the pair that is considered valid and all other duplicates 
(with different surnames) are marked invalid.  
 This measurement strategy clearly undercounts the actual number of undocumented workers 
in Georgia, but we can draw on a couple of sources of external data to show that our sample of 
undocumented workers closely represents the presence of unauthorized immigrants in the state of 
Georgia. First of all, the rate of growth seen in both the number and percent of undocumented 
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workers identified in Georgia matches closely the rate of growth in the Social Security 
Administration’s (SSA) earnings suspense file (ESF). The ESF is a repository of Social Security 
taxes paid by employers that cannot be matched to a valid name or SSN. It is widely believed that 
this growth in the ESF reflects growing incidence of unauthorized work in the United States 
(Bovbjerg, 2006). Figure S1 plots the number of workers (panel a) and the percent of workers (panel 
b) identified as undocumented along with the size of the ESF (we plot numbers only through 2006, 
since that is the last year for which the ESF data are available). This figure shows a remarkable 
consistency between the growth seen in workers identified as undocumented and the ESF.  
 As mentioned earlier, data suggest that between 40 and 60 percent of Mexicans in the United 
States are undocumented, and that 61 percent of unauthorized immigrants come from Mexico. 
Clearly not all Hispanics are undocumented, or vice versa; however, using weighted data from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), we calculate the average annual growth in total workers and total 
number of foreign-born, Hispanic workers in the United States and in Georgia to compare growth 
rates to those in our sample in order to provide a second validity test for our measure of the presence 
of unauthorized immigrants in Georgia. These results are reported in Table S1. The work force in GA 
grew faster over the period than the U.S. work force (2.9 vs. 1.5 percent, respectively). In addition, 
the number of foreign-born, Hispanic workers in the United States grew faster (8 percent per year) 
than the overall work force; other researchers have also documented this phenomenon (see Passel & 
Cohn, 2009). But most importantly for our purposes is that the growth rate of foreign-born, Hispanic 
workers in Georgia (roughly 27 percent per year), which is much larger than in the United States 
overall (also see Passel and Cohn, 2009), is similar to the growth in the number of workers in 
Georgia we classify with our measurement strategy as undocumented. We also observe a similarly 
large growth rate in the number of foreign-born, Hispanic workers with less than a high school 
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degree (21 percent), among which we might expect a larger share of undocumented workers than 
among foreign-born, Hispanics in general.  
 
Figure S1. Growth in the earnings suspense file and the total number and percent of workers 
identified as undocumented in Georgia, 1990 to 2006. 
 
 
Source: Huse (2002) for estimates 1990-2000, Johnson (2007) for estimates 2001-2004, and authors' 
calculations. Dollar estimates reflect 2006 values, using the PCE chain-weighted deflator. 
 
Table S1. Average annual growth, 1994-2008, in U.S. and GA employment, Hispanic workers, and 
workers identified as undocumented.  
Average Annual Growth Rate of:  
Total number of workers in the U.S. 1.43% 
Total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in the U.S. 7.26% 
 
Total number of workers in Georgia 
 
2.82% 
Total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in Georgia 20.74% 
 
Total number of workers in GA identified as undocumented 
 
29.65% 
Source: Current Population Survey, Basic Survey (March), 1994-2008; and authors' calculations. 
Note: 1994 is used as the base year since is the first year the Current Population Survey has a reliable 
indicator of Hispanic ethnicity 
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(a) Growth in earnings suspense file and number of 
undocumented workers identified in Georgia, 1990-2006.
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(b) Growth in earnings suspense file and percent of workers 
identified as undocumented in Georgia, 1990-2006.
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Undocumented (R)
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